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The focus of this paper is to show how the dominate ideology of liberation in 
Western society, otherwise known as liberalism, goes wrong in its assumptions about 
how power and freedom function. The arrogant missteps in the underpinnings ofliberal 
ideology have played a significant role in setting up and maintaining systematic barriers 
against women and minorities which work to the benefit of white men. In this paper I will 
follow the reasoning of Hannah Arendt, Michel Foucault, Marina Oshana and several 
feminist thinkers to show that autonomy and power are intertwined as mobile and 
constantly shifting sets of relations of power or force (in both a passive and active sense) 
that emerge from every social interaction and thus pervade the social body. Liberal 
notions of autonomy and freedom discussed either in terms of human rights or authorship 
of one's own choices are problematic and of limited value. I argue that even human rights 
are politically created, often in a way that advantages certain social groups over others. I 
also argue that regardless of whether one leads a life of her own choosing, one may still 
make choices that are disadvantageous to herself. Thus, I will be discussing freedom in 
terms of the capacity to begin, to start anew, to do something unexpected; while power 
will be discussed as phenomena experienced through our collective social engagements 
which run counter to, restrict, mold or otherwise inhibit our capacity to begin anew (i.e. 
behave in ways which the social groups in power have made previously unavailable or 
undesirable). The aims of liberalism are incompatible with these notions of freedom and 
power, which are relational, dyadic conditions, not commodities that can be acquired, 
possessed, and distributed. 
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In Marilyn Frye's Oppression, she describes oppressive barriers to women as consisting 
of "cultural and economic forces and pressures in a culture and economy controlled by men 
which, at every economic level and in all racial and ethnic subcultures, economy, tradition-and 
even ideologies of liberation-work to keep at least local culture and economy in male control."] 
The focus of this paper is to show how the dominate ideology ofliberation in Western society, 
otherwise known as liberalism, goes wrong in its assumptions about how power and freedom 
function. The arrogant missteps in the underpinnings of liberal ideology have played a significant 
role in setting up and maintaining systematic barriers against women and minorities which work 
to the benefit of white men.2 
Although feminism and liberalism are both movements championing emancipation, they 
differ in many critical ways. Historically, liberalism has fractured on many issues, but liberals 
have typically maintained that humans are naturally in a "state of perfect order to their actions ... 
as they think fit. .. without asking leave, or depending on the will of any other man.") Prima 
facie, liberalism appears to be a freedom creating movement as it stresses individual property 
rights, natural rights and the protection of civil liberties. For example, feminism's call to regulate 
pornography or to transfonn the traditional family, has often been seen by liberals as failing to 
respect the fundamental value of individual liberties. However, liberal accommodation of 
cultural and individual diversity, as well as liberal failure to engage with radical analyses of the 
1 Frye, Marilyn. "Oppression," The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory, (Toronto: The Crossing Press, 
1983), 13. 
2 It may be the case that white men suffer as well, albeit, through operating from a blindly immoral role. In this 
sense one may be inclined to believe that the character or moral fabric of white men is in jeopardy. However, the 
affects of such suffering are far less identifiable (at least to me) than the suffering of women and minorities. 
3 Locke, John. The Second Treatise of Government in Two Treatises of Government, Peter Laslett (ed.), (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1960),283-446. 
2 
constructive effects of social power, has led many feminists to see liberal theory and practice as a 
barrier to, rather than an ally in, the fight to liberate women. It seems that if emancipation (from 
any constraint) is an end worth seeking, then we must question whom our liberation ideologies 
are truly serving. 
In this paper I will follow the reasoning of Hannah Arendt, Michel Foucault, Marina 
Oshana and several feminist thinkers to show that autonomy and power are intertwined as mobile 
and constantly shifting sets of relations of power or force (in both a passive and active sense) that 
emerge from every social interaction and thus pervade the social body. Liberal notions of 
autonomy and freedom discussed either in terms of human rights or authorship of one's own 
choices are problematic and of limited value. I argue that even human rights are politically 
created, often in a way that advantages certain social groups over others. I also argue that 
regardless of whether one leads a life of her own choosing, one may still make choices that are 
disadvantageous to hersel£4 Thus, I will be discussing freedom in terms of the capacity to begin, 
to start anew, to do something unexpected; while power will be discussed as phenomena 
experienced through our collective social engagements which run counter to, restrict, mold or 
otherwise inhibit our capacity to begin anew (i.e. behave in ways which the social groups in 
power have made previously unavailable or undesirable). 5 The aims of liberalism are 
incompatible with these notions of freedom and power, which are relational, dyadic conditions, 
not commodities that can be acquired, possessed, and distributed. 
4 My primary concern here is not necessarily something that is disadvantageous to individual woman's happiness or 
utility, rather her status as a moral agent as recognized by society. 
5 I am not denying the existence or significance of the kind of centralized or governmental power that liberalism 
almost exclusively focuses on. However, I do contend that liberalism's concern with this sense of power creates a 
conceptual gap or barrier when trying to understand feminist arguments, perspectives, or ideals. 
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I: The Politics of Personal Autonomy 
In order to show where liberalism goes wrong, we first need an understanding of the 
inherent assumptions built into its ideology; both preservation of autonomy and human (or 
"natural") rights are mainstays of liberal ideology that I will be discussing as political concepts 
in this and the following section. Most strands ofliberalism claim the authority of the state rests 
on the consent of the governed, specifically, when this consent is given autonomously.6 While 
the core meaning of autonomy remains heavily debated, Rainer Forst describes two distinct 
conceptions of autonomy that are common to autonomy literature: "moral autonomy," whereby 
one is morally autonomous if one has the capacity to subject oneself to objective moral 
principles (which I address in a later section), and "personal autonomy," an apparently morally 
neutral characteristic that persons have when they alone direct their decisions, actions or lives.7 
Marina Oshana outlines the assumption many theorists make regarding the latter conception of 
autonomy. These theorists assume there exists, 
a "self' that is capable of acting, that this self has a coherent and sustained identity over time, and that the actor is 
"truly" or "deeply" herself in acting. A capacity for unimpaired critical self-reflection is included in standard 
accounts of autonomy as welL The task of self-reflection is to appraise aspects of a person's self, such as cognitive, 
affective, valuational, and dispositional states, as well as personal commitments, social roles, and ideals, to 
determine if these are components of the person's life with which the person "wholeheartedly identifies" or 
embraces without reservation so as to render them "authentic" to her.8 
6 Taylor, James Stacey. "Autonomy and Political Liberalism", Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 32, No.3 (July 
2006). 
7 Forst, Rainer. "Political Liberty: Integrating Five Conceptions of Autonomy," in John Christman (ed.) Autonomy 
and the Challenges to Liberalism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 229-337. 
8 Oshana, Marina A.L.. "Autonomy and Self-Identity," in John Christman (ed.) Autonomy and the Challenges to 
Liberalism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 77-100. 
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However, Oshana rejects this mainstream view, and contends that even if one believes 
that her self-conception is unhindered or uninfluenced by forces external to her, she may still 
have a significantly restricted level of autonomy (i.e. an unauthentic self-conception). In order to 
understand Oshana's argument, we must interpret one's "self-conception" as being what one 
considers the "ineliminable and intractable aspects" of oneselr,9 Oshana argues that a self-
conception of this sort is necessary because it gives autonomy the "notion of self-directed choice 
and action plausibility and coherence."l0 However, Oshana points out that some ofthe 
"ineliminable and intractable aspects" of a person's selfthat inform her self-conception might be 
ones that she does not endorse after she has critically reflected upon them (because she was 
previously unaware of their existence and influence). For example, a person's race and gender 
would be ineliminiable and intractable aspects of her self-conception, for we "cannot escape the 
racialized [and gendered] norms that define us, and that inform our self-concept, even where we 
regard these norms as alien.,,11 In other words, as long as we are members of mainstream society, 
we remain subject to the perceptions, treatment, and expectations that others have of our 
particular race or gender. I agree with Oshana that this SUbjection creates scripted identities or 
roles that members of each gender or race tend to fill regardless of whether they are cognizant of 
this process. Further, one's autonomy might be impugned by these inescapable aspects of her 
self-conception because the social circumstances that she lives in might be such as to prevent her 
from being fully able to exercise her autonomy. 12 For example, "being Black in a racist society 
9 Ibid, 80. 
lO Ibid, 84. 
II Ibid, 90. 
l2 Ibid, 91. 
5 
situates one in a position that narrows the range of one's autonomy even ifbeing Black is not 
itself antithetical to autonomy," a point that can also be said true with respect to women and their 
social position.1 3 
The process of fulfilling a scripted role is continuous and cyclical, which makes it 
difficult to see in action and even more difficult to fight against. 14 Since most of us do not see 
that race or gender roles are scripted or rigged by society, we often interpret our perceptions and 
attitudes of others merely as being responses to how specific groups of people naturally behave. 
For example, many men often admit feelings of contempt for women in general because they 
seem to naturally occupy themselves with less significant activities, hobbies and jobs than men. 
Whether its reading gossip magazines, putting on makeup or being employed in assistant-type 
positions (e.g. secretary, nurse, receptionist, babysitter, etc) women are trained from childhood in 
patriarchal society (both directly and indirectly) to be interested in these womanly activities 
which comprise their scripted roles as women. IS Often, these roles work to the financial, sexual, 
political, social, emotional and intellectual benefit of men. 
Marilyn Frye more fully develops how social circumstances narrow the range of 
autonomy for women, contending that there is a place, a sector, which is inhabited by women of 
aJl classes and races, not defined by geographical boundaries but by function. That function is 
13 Ibid, 91. 
14 I am using the term cyclical to describe the social process whereby individuals are trained as members of certain 
groups (due to classifying by physical attributes), such as females into the group women, and then live on to fulfill 
the roles and behaviors expected of their respective group. This process reinforces society's bias toward certain 
social groups, as the bias is misinterpreted as rational conceptions of the way these groups naturally behave. For 
example, as society observes women as generally interested in trivial matters more often than men, then this is what 
becomes expected of women from a young age (it reinforces their training). 
15 For a further account of role "rigging," see Marilyn Frye's Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory. 
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"the service of men and men's interests as men define them ... ,,\6 For example, women's service 
work always includes personal service (e.g. the work of maids, cooks, secretaries), sexual service 
(e.g. provision for men's sexual needs, bearing children, appearing physically desirable), and ego 
service (encouragement, praise, attention).!7 For those women fortunate enough not to directly 
serve in these ways, many are generally still responsible for hiring and supervising those who do 
it. The subjective experience of servitude varies with economic class, race, tradition and the 
personalities of the men in question, but regardless, women's service work is characterized by 
the destructive combination of responsibility and powerlessness: "we are held responsible and 
we hold ourselves responsible for good outcomes for men and children in almost every respect 
though we have in almost no case power adequate to that proj ect." \ 8 I do not contend that women 
are incapable of satisfying their own interests, nor deny that in some cases women's independent 
interests do overlap with men's. What I am asserting is that women who choose "pink collar" 
jobs or remain at home to care for their children do so at least in part because their other options 
are relatively unattractive and even less personally gratifying. 
Even so, liberals like Christina Sommers argue against this typical feminist criticism of 
women's societal roles. Sommers actually classifies herself as a "liberal feminist," aiming to 
promote equality of opportunity so that women have a fair chance to get what they want, 
whatever that might be. This stance is distinct from my position, which Sommers refers to as a 
"gender feminist," who regard traditional male-female relationships and social arrangements as 
inherently oppressive to women and who hold that such patriarchal institutions are detrimental to 
16 Frye, 9. 
17 Frye, 9. 
18 Frye, 9. 
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women's interests, regardless of whether or not women wish to participate in them, and ought to 
be dismantled. 19 Sommer's line of argument appears to be this: if women make free, rational and 
informed choices to remain faithful to conventional gender roles then there cannot be anything 
wrong with a state of affairs in which they occupy such roles. However, even if most women 
choose to pursue "traditional" goals (i.e. pink collar jobs/domestic service), it does not follow 
that these are the outcomes they would prefer all other things being equaZ?O It seems a great 
many women who rationally choose traditional roles, in the workplace and at home, are making 
the best of a relatively bad thing (as compared to the options available to men). 
Thus, unless our social environment affords women the same opportunity of exercising 
their autonomy as it does men (i.e. erasing gendered roles/identities which work to keep women 
restricted from, and often disinterested in, male-dominated jobs and activities), then one might 
conclude that the only thing of moral relevance regarding autonomy is that most women are 
currently satisfied with their roles and self-conception. Oshana's critique of autonomy 
undermines this liberal understanding, whereby "autonomy calls for an absence of alienation" 
and so "a person cannot be autonomous if she feels estranged from an aspect of her character that 
is essential to her self-concept.,,21 Many of the restrictions and limitations women and minorities 
live with are more or less internalized as part of their self-concepts, and are part of their 
adaptations to the requirements and expectations imposed by the needs and tastes and tyrannies 
of others. Thus, many women and minorities do not even feel alienated, because their self-
19 Baber, Harriet. "Choice, Preference and Utility: A Response to Sommers," in Armen T. Marsoobian (ed.) 
Metaphilosophy, (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1995) Vol. 26, No.4, 402-412. 
20 Ibid, 407. 
21 Frye, 93. 
concept has been molded and rigged by a social power system in a way that trains them not to 
see the differences in privileges as unjustified or sometimes even existent. An extreme form of 
this rigging is described in what Malcolm X refers to as "house niggers," who were slaves that 
tended to the master's personal needs and were kept close to the master's home.22 They were 
closely atttached to their masters and identified with their master's values and reasoning. They 
were given preferential treatment to the "field nigger" who lived and worked in the fields 
amongst the hogs and were treated as such. Since the house nigger was treated slighty less 
horribly than his fellow slaves in the field, he did not see the severity of his own oppression and 
did not consider his plight to be grotesquely unjustified and wrong. 
Oshana's account of autonomy is to be understood as a political concept. A question of 
whether one is autonomous with respect to (for example) her choices or her actions is a question 
that concerns whether it is she, and not someone else, who is directing them. This notion is 
distinct from the metaphysical view that many contemporary autonomy theorists hold, such as 
Flarry Frankfurt, who are concerned with "what conditions must be met for one to act freely and 
of her own free wil1:,23 Thinking of autonomy as a political (shaped/directed by social forces) 
rather than metaphysical concept is important for understanding the systematic manipulation of 
gender roles. Since the political and metaphysical concepts are not synonymous, intuitions that 
surround one ofthe concepts should not be drawn upon in discussions of the other. For example, 
one can act freely and of her own free will in the metaphysical sense of freedom (i.e. where she 
is not determined so to act, or if she is, this is compatible with her enjoying freedom of the will) 
22 Malcolm X. Speech: Message to The Grass Roots. Detroit, Nov 10, 1963. 
23 Taylor, 503. 
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even if she is manipulated into so acting by another person?4 Liberals tend to view autonomy in 
this metaphysical regard and therefore, do not levy blame on any manipulators. For instance, 
let's say a woman interviewing with male employer knows she will only be hired if she wears 
revealing clothing. Certainly the woman has the choice to wear what she wants or to even attend 
the interview. Yet, the woman is in a bind involving lack of employment on one hand and 
objectifying herself on the other. However, regardless of whether the woman feels comfortable 
or complicit with her situation, she is still in a bind, one that liberalism tends to ignore, because 
its primary concern is that the woman simply has a choice and is capable of choosing. My point 
is that the situation has been manipulated so that both options contribute to the systematic 
oppression of women (i.e. keeping them unemployed and sexual objects), yet, the system of 
manipulation is not always criticized or even recognized by liberals, because the woman is still 
considered free (metaphysically) to make a choice. It seems then, that liberalism's emphasis on 
metaphysical autonomy actually does little in way of emancipating individuals who are blind to 
or complacent with their own oppression. Thus, a disconnection must be made from 
metaphysical autonomy in our discussion of freedom. Carrying on my criticism of liberalism's 
failure to recognize the political nature of its core concepts, the following section will argue that 
even human rights are politically created, often in a way that advantages certain social groups 
over others. 
24 Ibid, 505. 
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II: The Politics of Rights 
The location of human rights in a metaphysical notion of autonomous sovereign subjects 
plays the leading role in the modem liberal conception of human rights. In this framework, 
human rights are viewed as inalienably possessed by sovereign subjects understood as bearers of 
rights. The two hallmarks of modem human rights, therefore, are individual agency and self-
determination. Looking at the work of Thomas Hobbes, we can see the roots of liberal notions of 
human rightS.25 Hobbes defines natural right as the "Liberty each man hath, to use his individual 
power as he will himself, for the preservation of his own Nature, that is to say, of his own life; 
and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgment and Reason, he shall conceive 
to be the aptest means thereunto.,,26 Hobbes locates natural right in the individual's own power 
and movement to do what he can do to preserve his own life. Hobbes then goes onto define 
liberty as "the absence of external Impediments," in other words, man has a natural freedom or 
right to everything. However, Arendt argues that this liberal tradition with its paramount 
concern for freedom and justice, does not grasp that politically even more fundamental than 
these supposed rights, is the right to action and opinion and the right to belong to a political 
community in which one's speech and action are rendered significant.27 
Demonstrating that full agency is contingent upon one's social/political standing, Hannah 
Arendt's own experience as a refugee reflects the political nature of human rights. Outside the 
law, and not belonging to any political community, Arendt and her fellow refugees found 
25 Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, Richard Tuck (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 
26 Hobbes, 91. 
27 Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1952), 297. 
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themselves in a moment when protection under the auspices of universal human rights was most 
desperately needed, yet no protection was given. Their outsidedness reduced them to "mere 
naked human beings" in a condition of complete rightlessness.,,28 Arendt argues: "If a human 
being loses his political status, he should, according to the implications of the inborn and 
inalienable rights of man, come under exactly the situation for which the declaration of such 
general rights provided. Actually the opposite is the case. It seems that a man who is nothing but 
a man has lost the very qualities which make it possible for other people to treat him as a fellow-
man.,,29 Those excluded from the political body also seem to be excluded from the status of full 
moral agent. Thus, liberal ideology jumps the gun with its concern for the preservation of natural 
rights, whereas Arendt (and myself) are concerned with first recognizing that these rights are 
contingent upon agency recognition among a political body. 
Further, Arendt rejects the notion of human rights as tied to Hobbesian sovereignty, and 
instead ties them to (as stated previously) the right to action and opinion and the right to belong 
to a political community in which one's speech and action are rendered significant. Arendt uses 
this rejection as her basis in reformulating the dominant philosophical understanding of freedom, 
which from Augustine onward has largely been understood as located in a SUbjective wilL 
Arendt's understanding of freedom, like Oshana's, is political, located not in the "I will" but in 
the "I am able.,,30 Following Aristotle, Arendt argues that freedom is experienced only in the 
process of acting. This capacity to act and move must be understood as the capacity to begin: 
"The Greek word archein which covers beginning, leading, ruling, that is, the outstanding 
28 Ibid, 296. 
29 Ibid, 300. 
30 Binningham, Peg. Hannah Arendt and Human Rights, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 54. 
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qualities ofthe free man, bears witness to an experience in which being free and the capacity to 
being something new coincide.,,3l From the outset, Arendt's understanding of freedom is 
inseparable from power, and the ability to begin. The "I am able" must be understood as the 
ability to act in a public space, to move in a space of freedom with others.32 As mentioned 
earlier, there is flaw in liberalism's assumption that if an individual is autonomous 
(metaphysically free as they see it), then she has the ability to act in public space.33 While this 
may be true, one's actions mean very little if her moral agency is not fully recognized in a 
manipulated public space, which is often the case, as evidenced by Arendt's own account of 
politcal outsidedness. However, the less extreme, but much more prevelant example of agency 
denial occurs when claims by women and minorities about manipulated binds in America (such 
as the previously mentioned example of the woman interviewing for employment) are treated in 
public space as mere nagging rather than legitmate claims of political injustice. My concern for 
agency recognition through public space will be more fully covered in a later section which 
incorporates both Arendt and Foucault's notions of power. However, we can conclude from this 
section that the natural rights liberalism values (e.g. right to happiness, property, speech, etc) 
only exist (or are at least recognized) when an individual is part of a political body. This means 
that persons lacking full membership in a political body will be denied the privileges or rights of 
those with full membership. Formal political equality did little to open new opportunities for 
women or materially improve their lives. Long after women had won the right to vote, serve on 
juries and hold public office, they were excluded from educational and vocational opportunities 
31 Ibid, 166. 
32 Binningham, 55. 
33 Liberals talk about political freedom, but they tend to do so in a Hobbesian sense-that is only within the 
governmental construct. 
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available to men?4 Thus, what liberal values would afford (i.e. protection of various natural 
rights) does not change the kind of oppression that women and minorities face as partial 
members of the political body. The following section provides a similar criticism of the political 
nature ofliberal fundamentals, which are taken by liberals to be nothing less than natural facts; I 
will show how liberalism's reliance of default background facts for political justification also 
works to inhibit the full agency of women. 
III: Objectivity and Liberalism 
Following the argumentation of Catharine MacKinnon, this section is intended to show 
that liberal theory tends to treat sex inequality primarily as a form of unjustifiable discrimination 
and thus fails to notice or address the systematic oppression of women that does not arise from 
such discrimination?5 According to Mackinnon, liberalism employs the "difference approach" to 
sex equality, in which "the legal mandate of equal treatment. .. becomes a matter oftreating likes 
alike and unlikes unlike; and the sexes are defined as such by their mutual unlikeness. ,,36 In other 
words, sex inequality is a result of women heing treated differently from men on occasions when 
they are, in fact, similar to men (e.g. a man is hired over an equally qualified woman). While this 
does indeed happen, MacKinnon claims that the problem of sex inequality is one of systematic 
exploitation of women by men. Thus, establishing sex equality involves more than working out 
the relevant differences between men and women in order to root out unwarranted 
34 Elson, Diane. "From Survival Strategies to Transformation Strategies: Women's Needs and Structural 
Adjustment," in Lourdes Beneria and Shelley Feldman (eds.) Unequal Burden. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1992). 
35 MacKinnon, Catherine, Feminism Unmod(fied, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987). 
36 Ibid, 32. 
discrimination. Instead, it involves abolishing the relations of domination and exploitation of 
sexuality which serve to both oppress and define women. 
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Further, liberals do more than just misdiagnose the nature of sex inequality. MacKinnon 
argues that objectivity is liberalism's "standard for standards," and yet adopting this standard 
prevents liberalism from considering the kind of oppression she highlights as raising issues of 
sex inequality.37 The basic problem is that liberals conceive of political justification in a manner 
that leads them to ask the wrong questions about sex inequality. My argument is not a criticism 
of objectivity per se, but of how a objectivity is used in political justification. Political 
justification involves drawing connections between political judgements and some set of pre-
political background facts. Many liberals rely on a position that holds that the background is 
made up of distinctions that are "morally relevant," or which are not "arbitrary from the moral 
point ofview.,,38 Anthony Laden describes background facts and their social significance in the 
context of what he calls "social ontology.,,39 For example, what explains that biological 
difference in primary sex characteristics is regarded to be both a descriptively and nonnatively 
significant difference between people, whereas toe length is not? Often, background facts are 
used to justify social facts, which include the contents and shapes of our social roles (i.e. our 
identities). For example, "Jesse is a woman," picks out a social fact ifit means that Jesse 
manifests the set of social characteristics associated with being gendered female.4o Descriptively, 
this means that what explains the significance of a particular social distinction is the existence of 
37 Ibid, 42. 
38 Laden, 137. 
39Thid, 138. 
40 Ibid, 138. 
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a significant background fact with which it correlates-these objective background facts are 
taken as primary. For instance, if we want to know if gender differences are descriptively 
significant, we need to ask about the significance of the correlating background category: sex. 
The significance of background facts is in tum taken to rely on information contained within the 
realm of those facts. Many liberals point to the lack of differences in rationality, autonomy or 
other essentially human attributes between men and women to determine that sex differences are 
morally irrelevant, and thus not significant background facts. Upon deeming sex differences 
irrelevant and thus attempting to establish equal grounds of gender capability, liberals are 
ignoring the significant impact gendered (and racialized) social molding and rigging has upon 
the societal roles and behaviors (such as those discussed in previous sections) which give rise to 
the oppressive differences between men and women. 
MacKinnon argues that for at least some categories, including gender, it is the social 
world (rather than background facts) that is primary. For such socially constructed categories, 
then, their significance is not traceable to, or justifiable by, any set of correlating background 
facts. Rather, it is social power that constructs these social categories directly, by organizing 
them, and carving up the social world using them, and thus marking them as significant.41 Thus, 
it is the mapping from the social (i.e. politically created facts/norms) to the background facts, 
rather than the purported intrinsic significance ofthe background categories themselves, that 
makes certain "objective" differences significant by giving them social relevance. 
41 MacKinnon, Catherine. Toward a Feminist Theory o/the State, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 
113. 
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Since liberal policy employs a justificatory method that relies on what liberals consider 
"morally relevant" background facts in things like judicial decisions and congressional debate, of 
which sex differences are excluded, it allows for the systematic disadvantaging of women 
without ever having to mention sex (because it is not significant in their view). MacKinnon 
argues that such policy will only need to rely on the "morally relevant" characteristics that a 
patriarchal society has implicitly designated as masculine or feminine. 42 If MacKinnon's theory 
of constructive power is correct with regard to gender, however, then the reason that such a 
policy will appear justified, will not appear as discrimination at all, is that social power has done 
its work all too well. Adopting background facts as primary and objective, can lead us to accept 
the deepest features of our social world as given, rather than as the result of unequal distributions 
of social power, and thus keeps us from challenging the status quo. Since the state often shapes 
the social world not directly through its actions, but indirectly, by determining what counts as 
injustice and what is legitimate, the state can and does playa hidden role in the objectification 
and oppression of women. 
Thus, if liberalism is to open its eyes to the systematic oppression of women, what is 
needed is not further refinement of the category of "moral relevance" or discussion of what, 
precisely, is "arbitrary from a moral point of view," but a wholly different conception of political 
justification-a conception formed around different notions of power and freedom. The liberal 
treatment of sex differences as irrelevant background facts works to deny women public space to 
voice and discuss gender differences that cause legitimate inequalities. As stated in the previous 
section, inhibited or partial membership in a political body denies individuals crucial human 
42 Laden, 142. 
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rights; the denial of adequate public space for women is one such product. In the next section, I 
will follow the thinking of Michel Foucault to explicate a notion of power which is compatible 
with Hannah Arendt's notion of freedom as the capacity to begin anew and act in public space. 
This discussion will coalesce into my overarching concern of the recognition of women's moral 
agency. 
IV: Foucault and Arendt: Power as a Decentralized Notion 
Although Foucault and Arendt develop different ways of conceptualizing power, their respective 
conceptions are ultimately rooted in a critique of one and the same understanding of power, 
which Foucault labels the juridical model and Arendt refers to as the command-obedience 
mode1.43 This model equates power with the rule of law and presupposes that the paradigmatic 
power relation is that by which a sovereign imposes his will on his subjects.44 When power is 
conceived of in this way, the primary sphere in which power is seen as operating is that of the 
State. This notion of power is paradigmatic of the concerns of classic liberalism. Insofar as this 
model views the exercise of power as the imposition of the will of a powerful individual on that 
of a powerless one, it tends to conceive of power as a fundamentally restrictive, repressive, 
negative force. As Arendt phrases it, this model rests on the assumption "that men can lawfully 
and politically live together only when some are entitled to command and the others forced to 
43 Kaplan, Morris. Sexual Justice: Democratic Citizenship and the Politics of Desire, (New York: Routeledge, 
1997),154. 
44 The study of Foucault's thought is complicated because his ideas developed and changed over time. Just how they 
changed and at what levels is a matter of some dispute amongst scholars of his work. The notions of power I am 
using corne from his later work toward the end of the 1970s. 
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obey.,,45 Likewise, Foucault claims that this model views power in terms of "an essentially 
negative power, presupposing on the one hand a sovereign whose role is to forbid and on the 
other a subject who must somehow effectively say yes to this prohibition.'.46 Both Foucault and 
Arendt start their own analyses of power by challenging this notion of power as sovereignty; in 
other words, both strive to cut off the head of the King, who is centralized in liberalsim.47 
Foucault puts forth two main criticisms about the juridical model of power. First, he is 
critical of its assumption that power is restricted to a very limited sphere within social and 
political life. On this model, power resides in the hands of the sovereign and is extended outward 
in social space only by being wielded over individuals in and through the sovereign'S 
commands.48 Consequently, it is assumed that wherever individuals are out ofthe reach of the 
sovereign, they are free from power. However, Foucault's aim is to invert this mode of analysis 
and in doing so, call attention to "not the domination of the king in his central position, ... but 
that of his subjects in their mutual relations: not the uniform edifice of sovereignty, but the 
mUltiple forms of subjugation that have a place and function within the social organism.,,49 Let 
me note that this method does not commit Foucault to denying that there are regulated fomls of 
power in those central locations; all it does commit him to is the claim that the peripheral 
relations of domination and subjugation that are obscured by a narrow focus on such centralized 
forms must also be given their due. 
45 Arendt, Hannah. On Violence, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1969),36. 
46 Foucault, Michel. "Power and Strategies," in Colin Gordon (ed.), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other 
Writings, 1972-1977, (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 140. Henceforth: PS. 
47 Allen, Amy. "Power, Subjectivity, and Agency: Between Arendt and Foucault," International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies Vol.10, No.2, 131-149. 
48 Ibid, 133. 
49 Foucault, Michel. "Two Lectures," Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writing, 96. Henceforth: TL. 
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Foucault's second criticism of the juridical model is that it views power as an essentially 
negative, repressive, and prohibitive force. According to Foucault, this repressive model is too 
narrow as it "enables power never to be thought of in other than negative terms: refusal, 
limitation, obstruction, censorship. Power is what says no.,,50 In light of these criticisms, 
Foucault champions a new power model, viewing power as "diffuse and capillary, omnipresent, 
and both productive and repressive.,,51 The juridical model, given its assumption that power is 
always and only repressive, presupposes a conception ofthe individual SUbject/agent as a fully 
formed, stable and unified entity that then gets caught up in power relations which are external to 
its own constitution.52 However, according to Foucault, "it is already one of the prime effects of 
power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be 
identified and constituted as individuals. The individual, that is, is not the vis-a.-vis of power; it 
is, I believe, one of its prime effects."s3 
For Foucault, individual subject/agents don't come into the world fully formed; they are 
constituted in and through a set of social relations, all of which are imbued with power. Thus, 
power is a key clement in the very formation of individuals. Foucault asserts that individuals are 
subjected in a dual sense: they are subjected to the complex, multiple, shifting relations of power 
in their social field and at the same time are enabled to take up the position of a subject in and 
50 FOllcault PS, 139. 
51 Allen, 133-134. 
52 I am using the notions of subject/agent found in Amy Allen's "Power, Subjectivity, and Agency: Between Arendt 
and Foucault." Allen interprets subjectivity as a precondition for agency, claiming that one cannot have the ability or 
capacity to act (i.e. agency) without having the ability or capacity to deliberate (i.e. a thinking subject). 
53 Foucault TL, 98. Note: My interpretation of Foucault does not commit him to the strong claim that the individual 
is merely or nothing more than an effect of power, but that his accollnt of power offers an analysis of the historically 
and culturally specific condition of possibility for subjectivity and agency in modern, Western, industrialized 
societies. 
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through those relations.54 In short, Foucault claims that power is a condition for the possibility of 
individual sUbjectivity. Understanding these notions helps in identifying the systematic 
manipulation that arises from the power discrepancy between the social roles of male and 
female. Within this context, it seems that patriarchal society shapes the identities of women to 
be more severely or intensely subjected to the relations of power, whereas men are more often 
enabled to take up the position of an acting and influential subject through those relations. 
Like Foucault, Arendt has two main criticisms of the juridical or as she calls it, the 
command-obedience model of power. First, she argues that the command-obedience model came 
about when two interdependent aspects of action-beginning or leading (archein) and seeing an 
action through or achieving (prattein }-were separated. When this happened, the beginner or 
leader became the ruler who gives commands, and action became identified with the mere seeing 
through or executing of those commands on the part of his subjects that was originally 
characteristic of prattein.55 In other words, once power began to be understood in the command-
obedience model and action began to be identified with the execution ofthe ruler's commands, 
these original conceptions of action and power were covered over and forgotten. 
As I mentioned in a previous section, Arendt aims to recover the original understanding 
of action as beginning something anew. In The Human Condition, Arendt links this notion of 
acting with the human condition of natality, the sheer fact that all human beings are born into the 
world.56 Natality derives its significance from the fact that the newcomer is capable of action. 
54 Allen, 135. 
55 Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 189. 
56 For Arendt, natality represents not only the birth of each unique individual, but the capacity of each individual to 
act and hence to begin something new. Arendt writes that "natality, and not mortality, may be the central category of 
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This notion of action is constitutive of the individual as an agent. Action discloses who, instead 
of what, the actor is: "In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their 
unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world."s7 Arendt's 
account of the dialectical constitution of the individual agent through action seems to prefigure 
Foucault's account of the constitution of the subject through subjection. She claims, "nobody is 
the author or producer of his own life story ... the stories, the results of action and speech reveal 
an agent, but this agent is not an author or producer. Somebody began it and is its subject in the 
twofold sense of the word, namely its actor and sufferer, but nobody is its author."s8 Arendt's 
agent is at the same time both sufferer and doer, both subject to the constraints of the actions of 
others and made into a subject with the capacity to act by the web of social relationships within 
which one must act. 
However, while power is the result of action (specifically, collective action), it is also a 
condition for the possibility of action. Arendt maintains that power, defined as "the human 
ability not just to act but to act in concert," both makes possible and preserves the public, 
political realm in which individuals act.S9 Insofar as one's identity as an actor is only fully 
realized in and through action in the public, political realm, which is constituted by power, for 
Arendt, power is a condition for the possibility of the full achievement of agency. Additionally, 
Arendt maintains that power "preserves the public realm and the space of appearance ... without 
politicaL.thought." And she describes the fact of natality as the miracle that saves the world and that bestows on 
human affairs "faith and hope." However, one can also argue that by virtue of natality and the ability to act each new 
individual poses a threat to civilization. I am concerned with the kinds of threats acting anew can pose to the 
patriarchal nature of our society. 
57 Ibid, 179. 
58 Ibid, 184. 
59 Ibid, 198. 
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power, the space of appearance brought forth through action and speech in public will fade as 
rapidly as the living deed and the living word.,,6o Once more this brings us back to the limited 
role of women in society; the vast imbalance between men, trained and identified as active doers, 
and women, trained and identified to act more passively, maintains a confining social role for 
women. For instance, from a young age men are taught to ignore their emotions because they 
hurt a man's ability to get things done, to be a doer, while on the other hand women do not 
receive such training and are often in the role of having a doer do unto them (e.g. common 
vernacular treats the male role in intercourse as an accomplishment on his part, of having done 
her). 
V: The Macroscopic Problem 
The criticisms I have layed forth against liberalism are both large in scope and 
multifaceted. These criticisms do not apply to all subsidiary schools of liberal thought, but are 
intended to raise caution in the minds ofthose who fundamentaly value freedom in terms of 
natural rights or autonomous action. For these individuals seem to often overlook that socio-
political recognition of one's moral agency is primary, and that their concern for rights and 
autonomy are contingent upon this recongition. In the Two Concepts of Liberty, Isaih Berlin 
explains the difference between the two main ideas ofliberty in terms of positive and negative 
liberty.61 Whereas c1assicalliberals aim for liberty in its negative sense, that is, the liberty from 
external constraints, the modern form ofliberalism tries to achieve liberty in its positive sense, 
by providing opportunities and presenting alternatives. Certainly, the latter sounds like an aim 
60 Ibid, 204. 
61 Berlin, 1saih. Two Concepts o/Liberty. (Lectures delivered at Oxford: October 31, 1958). 
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condusive with feminist goals of liberation, for women to have the opportunities to enjoy the 
benefits of men. However, we must question what kinds of opportunities and alternatives our 
society is seeking and whom do they actually serve. As Malcolm X warns, a "good" opportunity 
for the slave who is blind to his oppression may be to better his standing with his master, instead 
of doing something anew or unexpected such as fleeing, or breaking away from his bondage. In 
this sense, what an autonomous individual believes to be a good-creating act is inconsistent with 
a freedom-creating act. Perhaps most unfortunate in this case is that should the slave realize his 
unjustified social position, the lack of recognition of his agency or right to have rights, he will 
likely be intimidated by the severe consequences of acting unexpectedly. The same can be said 
true of the plight of the modem women, who if acting in the unexpected ways of feminism or 
lesbianism is outcast by patriarchal mainstream society. Doing something anew in this way 
suggests a breach of the rigging ofthe gender roles we are born into; it is an empowering 
declaration from the acting individual that she is not the kind of being worthy of her typical 
treatment and is capable of not obeying those who deem her actions as insubordinate or even just 
silly. A woman loudly voicing her frustrations with being constantly objectified is often 
construed negatively as bitching or nagging and is countered with criticism and contempt 
intended to make her feel crazy for thinking what is happening to her is wrong. This process 
denies women adequate public space to communicate and have their concerns be given uptake as 
legitmate societal problems worthy of national political attention and action. 
Further, Foucault and Arendt's analysis of power as a pervasive web of social 
relationships offers a more practical framework to discuss gender in qualities than the classical 
liberal take on power as a centralized force constraining all those sovereign to it. Liberalism's 
focus on the central power of the State keeps public attention to the condition of power in our 
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individual relationships merely in the peripheral. Thus, we tend not to think of ourselves as the 
products of an interplay of personal relationships of power, but rather as beings trying to escape 
certain undesirable restrictions of the powerful central government. Whether it be tax refonn, 
homeland security issues, or otherwise, what is seen as legitimate and worthy political concerns 
primarily deal with the effects of centralized power, pushing the concerns of the feminist to the 
wayside. 
Additionally, the liberal reliance on background facts about human rights is not 
all together destructive. In light of Arendt, if our fundamental facts we use to justify policy 
changes and political action were centered around preserving the right of individuals to have 
rights and the right to access public space, perhaps situations in which the agency of women is 
jeopardized would arise less frequently. Liberals faced with evidence of gender inequality and 
policies that might redress it, will have no theoretical tools with which to take up such charges or 
see such policies as calls for equality rather than special pleading or unwarranted interference 
with citizens' "private" lives (because they do not recognize gender differences as morally 
relevant). Until the feminist's concerns and feelings about gender differences are given political 
uptake, they cease to be legitimate or real; and as holders of illegitmate and unreal conceptions 
of how society functions, women (feminist or not) are forced to operate in positions oflimited 
agency. 
It may seem condescending or arrogant to convey the aims of this paper in a way which 
suggests that many content individuals who consider themselves free and capable of acting as 
they wish, may in fact be oppressed and currently incapable of freedom-creating actions. Liberal 
critics of feminism, like Sommers, assume that women currently have the same options as their 
male counterparts and then point to the fact that women, by and large, still make different 
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choices from their male counterparts as evidence that most women prefer la difference. The 
assumption is however, plainly false. As stated earlier, formal political equality did little to open 
new opportunities for women or materially improve their lives. Long after women had won the 
right to vote, serve on juries and hold public office, they were excluded from educational and 
vocational opportunities available to men. Currently, legislation mandating equal opportunity in 
employment is routinely ignored and women who succeed, against the odds, in breaking into 
"non-traditional" jobs are treated very differently from their male colleagues.62 It should scarcely 
be surprising that most women prefer traditional roles to non-traditional roles under conditions of 
harassment, prejudice, contempt, belittling, etc. However, this does not show that most women 
prefer traditional roles to non-traditional roles under the conditions on which they are available 
to most men. 
Furthermore, even apart from ongoing discrimination in hiring harassment on the job 
women remain at a disadvantage because they continue to work the double shift. The market 
appears to treat women as individuals in their own right. However, so long as women carry the 
double burden of unpaid work in the reproduction and maintenance of human resources as well 
as paid work producing goods and services, then women are unable to compete with men in the 
market on equal terms. Legislation for equal pay and opportunities and diminution of 
"traditional" barriers to women working outside the home cannot by themselves free women 
from domestic burdens and expectations.63 Access to markets has benefits for women, but those 
benefits are always limited, even if markets are entirely free from gender discrimination. 




by unequal gender relation. Women with high incomes can reduce their disadvantage in the 
market relative to men by buying substitutes for their own unpaid work-employing cleaners, 
maids, nannies, and cooks. But even this does not obliterate their disadvantage, as they still have 
responsisbility for household management. All other women who are not in the highest income 
groups do not have this option and must undertake a "double day" of work. 64 
The moral is that a little progression away from our current norms of patriarchy is a 
dangerous thing insofar as it burdens women with wage labor in addition to domestic work, 
without the opportunities men have in the labor market or the support services they enjoy at 
horne. Ifwomen reject this state of affairs it may not be, as Sommers suggests, because feminism 
as gone too far, but rather because it has not, yet, gone nearly far enough. 
The classical liberal response to this entire feminist critique is that if individuals are 
acting as they wish, regardless of social influences, then they are free. However, to accept this 
stance is to accept the plight of the house nigger. It seems there are extreme cases in which it is 
permissible to attempt to reveal a macroscopic picture of oppression to those that are blind to 
their own oppression. My hope is that this paper lowers our standards of what counts as extreme, 
and that the plight ofthe modern woman is remains one of inhibited agency in a web of 
systematically oppressive relationships. 
64 Ibid. 
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